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Abstract
Baulch,  Chuyen, Haughton, and Haughton examine the  The authors then estimate  and decompose  a set of
latest  quantitative  evidence on disparities in living  expenditure  regressions which show that even if minority
standards  between  and among different ethnic groups in  households  had the same endowments as Kinh
Vietnam.  Using data from the 1998 Vietnam  Living  households,  this would close no more than a third of the
Standards  Survey and 1999 Census, they  show that Kinh  gap  in per capita expenditures.  While  some ethnic
and Hoa ("majority")  households  have substantially  minorities seem to be doing well with a strategy  of
higher living standards  than "minority"  households  from  assimilating  (both culturally and economically)  with the
Vietnam's  other 52 ethnic  groups.  Subdividing the  Kinh-Hoa majority,  other groups are attempting  to
population into five broad categories,  the authors  find  integrate  economically  while retaining distinct cultural
that while the Kinh, Hoa, Khmer, and Northern  identities.  A third group  comprising the Central
Highland minorities have benefited  from economic  Highland  minorities, including the Hmong, is largely
growth in the 1990s, the growth of Central Highland  being left behind  by the growth process.
minorities has stagnated.  Disaggregating further,  they  Such diversity  in the socioeconomic  development
find that the same ethnic groups whose living standards  experiences of the different ethnic minorities indicates
have risen  fastest are those that have the highest school  the need for similar  diversity in the policy interventions
enrollment rates,  are most likely to intermarry with Kinh  that are designed to assist  them.
partners, and are the least likely to practice  a religion.
This paper-a product of Macroeconomics  and Growth, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the
group to study household welfare and poverty reduction in Vietnam.  Copies of the paper are available free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Emily Khine, room MC3-301, telephone 202-473-7471,
fax 202-522-3518,  email address kkhine@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  Jonathan  Haughton  may be contacted  at jhaughto@beaconhill.org.  May 2002.  (25 pages)
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Vietnam  is an ethnically  diverse  society.  The Kinh ("lowland  Vietnamese")  majority,  which accounts  for
84%  of the population,  co-exists  with  53  smaller ethnic  minority  groups, some  of which have  less than
1,000  members  (Dang,  Son  and  Hung,  2000).  Previous  research  using the  Vietnam  Living  Standards
Surveys,  in  which  the  Kinh  are  usually  grouped  together  with  the  Hoa  (Chinese),  has  shown  that the
remaining  52  ethnic  minorities  constitute  the  poorest,  least  educated  sections  of Vietnamese  society
(Vietnam Poverty Working Group,  1999).1  Furthermore,  the gap in living standards  between the Kinh and
Hoa  majority  and the  other  ethnic  minorities  grew between  1993  and  1998  (the  years when  the closely
comparable  Vietnam  Living Standards  Surveys  were  undertaken).  Geography,  in particular  the fact that
many  ethnic  minorities  live  in remote  and  mountainous  areas,  explains  only a part of the  difference  in
living  standards  between  these  two  groups.  There  are  systematic  differences  in  endowments  and  the
returns  to  those  endowments  for members  of the  Kinh-Hoa  majority  and  the  ethnic  minorities,  most of
which  are  in favor of the majority  group (Van de Walle  and Gunewardana,  2001).  These and other more
detailed  qualitative  studies  (see in  particular,  Jamieson,  Cuc  and Rambo,  1998;  Huy  and Dai,  1999,  and
Winrock  International,  1996)  have  led  to  an  emerging  consensus  among  donors  and non-governmental
organizations  (NGOs)  that  a  new,  more  differentiated  approach  to ethnic  minority policy  is  required  in
Vietnam.
This study seeks to contribute  to this debate by examining and decomposing  the latest quantitative  evidence
on disparities  in living standards between and among the different ethnic groups in Vietnam.  We first use a
range  of socioeconomic  variables  to  examine the  differences  in  living standards  between  the  Kinh-Hoa
majority and the other ethnic minorities,  and how these changed between  1993 and  1998.  This is followed
by a more detailed examination, employing  data from both the VLSS and the  1999 Population and Housing
Census, of socioeconomic differences  among minority groups.  A more nuanced picture starts to emerge, in
which the  ethnic groups  that have  done best are  shown to be those  that have assimilated most  with  Kinh
society while the less assimilated groups (particularly those in the Central Highlands and the Hmong in the
Northern Uplands) have been left behind.2
After  a  brief examination  of government  policy  toward  ethnic  minorities,  we  turn  to  a  more  detailed
explanation  of why many  ethnic  minority households  are  so poor.  Distinguishing  between  endowments
(comprising both physical  and human capital) and returns to those endowments,  we tease out the  effects of
each of these using the VLSS data.  A set of expenditure regressions  are estimated and decomposed,  which
show that even if ethnic  minority households had the  same endowments  as the Kinh and Hoa,  this would
close  no  more  than  a  third  of the  gap  in their  living  standards.  Such diversity  in  the  socioeconomic
development  experiences  of the  different  ethnic  minority  groups  indicates  that  the  need  for  a  similar
diversity in the policy interventions designed to assist them.
The Majority-Minority  Gap in Living Standards
The  clearest  evidence  of  the  gap  in  living  standards  between  the  Kinh-Hoa  majority  and  the  ethnic
minorities  comes  from  the  Vietnam  Living  Standards  Surveys  of  1992-93  (VLSS93)  and  1997-98
(VLSS98).  The  1992-93  survey  covered  4,234  Kinh  and  Hoa  households,  and  566  ethnic  minority,
households; the sample sizes for the  1997-98  were 5,151  and 848 households respectively.  As can be seen
from the map in Figure  1, with the exception of the Chinese (Hoa), the ethnic minorities are concentrated  in
the more remote regions of Vietnam,  especially the Northern  Uplands and Central Highlands.
I The Hoa comprise  approximately 2% of the population of Vietnam,  live predominantly in urban areas and, as will be shown below,
are highly assimilated with the Kinh.
2  In conformity with usual academic usage, we use "assimilate" to mean the selective and voluntary adoption by minority groups of
the economic  strategies, livelihood practices and cultural norms common among the majority group.  The adoption of such strategies,
practices and norms are selective because they need to be compatible with the socioeconomic conditions of the minorities, and are
voluntary because the decision on whether not to adopt them is made, usually on an individual or household basis, by the ethnic
minorities themselves.  As such our usage of word assimilate would best translate into Vietnamese as hoa dong or hoa nhap.
Page 1Where 54% of Kinh-Hoa had expenditures below the General  Statistical Office (GSO)/World Bank poverty
line  in  1992-93,  this proportion  had dropped  to 31%  by  1997-98.  During  the  same  period  the poverty
headcount  among  for the  remaining  minorities  only  fell  from 86%  to 75%.  So  despite  constituting just
14%  of the  total  population,  ethnic  minorities  now  make  up  29% of all the  poor  in Vietnam  (Vietnam
Poverty  Working  Group,  1999).  Provincial  level  poverty  maps  constructed  by  merging  data  from  the
VLSS98  with the  1999 Census show that there are  14 provinces with rural poverty headcounts of over 60%
(Minot and Baulch, 2001).  Of these  14 provinces,  12  have populations in which ethnic minorities make up
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A number of socioeconomic  indicators related to the household are gathered together into Table 1, which is
based on the data from  VLSS93  and  VLSS98.  For  1993,  the summary  measures  in Table  1 are based on
the full sample of 4,800 households.  For  1998 we present data both for the full sample of 5,999 households
living in 194 communes, and also for a sub-sample  of 48 communes that are ethnically mixed.3 This  latter
sub-sample  can be used to examine whether the living standards  of ethnic minorities  households are  worse
than  those  of their  Kinh  and Hoa neighbors,  and  so  provides  a  crude  way to  control  for the  otherwise
pervasive  effects  of geography.  To  test  whether  the values  of each  of these variables  are  the  same  for
majority  and minority households,  we  have  computed  p-values  based on  t-tests (for continuous  variables)
and  chi-squared tests  (for binary  variables):  these  are displayed in the "test"  columns.  The data for  1998
have been  weighted to correct  for the sampling  design of the second  VLSS (in which different households
have different probabilities of being enumerated).
3  The full VLSS98 sample also included  140 communes  with only Kinh  or Hoa households and 6 communes where only ethnic
minorities were enumerated.
Page 2Table  I shows that,  with an annual per capita expenditure that averaged VND1.54  million ($125)  in 1998,
minority households  were  far poorer than their Kinh  and Hoa counterparts  (VND3.Omillion).4 And while
spending  for the  majority  groups  rose  by  38%  in  real  terms  between  1993  and  1998,  the  increase  for
minority  households  was  much smaller,  at  18%.  The  lower  living standards  of minority  households  are
partly  due to the fact that they tend to be larger than Kinh households (5.4 vs. 4.6 members  in 1998),  are
more likely to  include  young children  (15%  vs.  10%) and  are more likely  to span three generations  (27%
vs.  18%).  The fertility rate  for minority women  is about 25%  higher than  for Kinh and Hoa women  (see
Desai 2000).  Ethnic minority households  are also less likely to be able to speak Vietnamese  and are much
less likely to live in urban areas (2% vs. 27%)
1993  1998
Full sample  Full sample  Mixed  communes only^*
Kinh-  Minor-  Kn-  Minor-  Test  Kinh-  Minor-  Test
Hoa  ities  Ha  ities  Hoa  ities
Sample size (weighted)  4,234  565  521  738  931  575
Expenditure per capita, '000 dong p.a.*  2,142  1,299  2,952  1,536  0.00  2,742  1,604  0.00
Household Size  4.89  5.52  4.61  5.41  0.00  4.71  5.37  0.00
Proportion of household that is:
Aged  0-6  0.16  0.20  0.10  0.15  0.00  0.11  0.14  0.01
Aged 7-16  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.27  0.00  0.24  0.27  0.05
Male, aged over 16  0.28  0.27  0.30  0.28  0.00  0.29  0.28  0.06
Female, aged over 16  0.35  0.30  0.37  0.31  0.00  0.36  0.31  0.00
Proportion of households consisting of:
One or two adults  0.07  0.03  0.10  0.04  0.00  0.10  0.04  0.00
Parent(s) and one child  0.15  0.12  0.14  0.07  0.00  0.11  0.07  0.02
Parent(s) and two children  0.21  0.15  0.24  0.18  0.01  0.25  0.19  0.04
Parent(s) and three or more children  0.38  0.44  0.33  0.41  0.00  0.35  0.41  0.15
Three generation household  0.17  0.23  0.18  0.27  0.00  0.17  0.27  0.00
Other  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.78  0.02  0.02  0.68
Age  of head of household, years  45.8  42.1  48.3  44.2  0.00  46.8  44.0  0.00
Prop. of female-headed  households  0.28  0.16  0.28  0.17  0.00  0.26  0.17  0.01
Prop. hhs interviewed  in Vietnamese  1.00  0.47  1.00  0.79  0.00  1.00  0.89  0.00
Prop. of households in urban areas  0.22  0.04  0.27  0.02  0.00  0.25  0.02  0.00
Notes: * In  January 1998 prices.  *B  Based on subsample that includes only those communes where Kinh-Hoa  and minority households
are present.
Sources:  VLSS93 and VLSS98.
Ethnic  minority households  are  less  well-served  by the health  system  (Desai,  2000).  Just  47% of ethnic
minority mothers  in the  1998  VLSS  sample  sought prenatal  care, compared  with 70%  for Kinh mothers.
Furthermore  only  30%  of ethnic  minority  births  were  assisted  by a  doctor/physician  or  nurse/midwife,
compared to 81%  for the Kinh.  Similarly, 75%  of ethnic minority parents consulted a health care provider
when  a child  (5-60  months)  was  sick,  compared  with  88%  for Kinh  households.  And roughly  50%  of
minority children of one year or older have received the four main vaccinations,  compared with about 60%
for Kinh children.5
However, it is important not to overemphasize  the contrasts, because an outside observer  is more likely to
be struck by the similarities between  the socio-demographic  characteristics of the two groups.  For instance,
Desai (2000) shows that contraceptive  usage rates  are broadly similar across ethnic groups:  55%  of ethnic
minority married women aged  15  to 44 reported that they use a modem method of contraception, compared
to 59% among Kinh women and 35%  among Chinese women.
Although  the expenditure  level of minority  households  is much lower than  that of Kinh-Hoa  households,
the  mean  consumption  of calories  is  only  slightly  lower  (2,068/day/capita  for  minorities  vs.  2,115  for
Kinh);  if adult equivalents  are used, the  difference  (2,681  vs. 2,695)  is negligible  (Desai 2000, Table  3.6).
This  helps explain  the otherwise  surprising finding that the mean body mass index of minority men is the
same  as that  for Kinh men (19.9),  and  only  slightly lower  for minority  women  (19.6) than Kinh  women
(20.1).  Indeed  Desai  (2000,  Table  6.2)  finds  that  a  smaller  proportion  of minority  men  are  severely
The prices are those of January  1998.  The exchange rate in January  1998 was VND12,290/$US.
The vaccinations  are BCG (for TB), DPT, polio and measles.
Page 3malnourished  (3.6%)  than  Kinh  men  (6.3%),  although  the  gap  is  less  evident  for  women  (8.0%  for
minorities  vs.9.4%  for Kinh).  Nonetheless,  it remains  the case  that the children  of ethnic minorities  are
more likely to be stunted, a measure of long-term malnutrition (Haughton  and Haughton  1999).
In  short, by Vietnamese  standards, ethnic  minority households  look significantly  different from Kinh-Hoa
households.  But both  fit  groups  broadly  within  Vietnamese  norms,  and  both  groups  have  experienced
similar trends  in living standards:  rising expenditures,  falling fertility and household  size, and  comparable
levels of malnutrition.
Differences Among Minority Groups
(i) Expenditures
Not all ethnic minority groups  are equally disadvantaged.  This is an important point, because if ethnicity is
used to help target government interventions  such as food subsidies  or scholarships, then there will be less
wastage  if the relevant  targets  can  be identified  more  precisely.  The  practical  problem here  is that the
VLSS  surveys  did  not  sample  enough  ethnic  minority  households  to  allow  for  much  disaggregation;
moreover the VLSS93 codes only allowed for 10 different ethnic groupings rather than the standard official
list of 54 distinct groups.  The VLSS questionnaires  also only collected  information on the ethnicity of the
head of the household.  This does not  allow one,  for instance, to analyze  minority issues at the individual
(as distinct from household) level, or to explore the extent of inter-marriage between ethnic groups.
The best that one can do with the VLSS data under these circumstances  is to separate households into a few
relatively homogeneous  categories  based on  the  ethnicity of the  head.  We  distinguish  three of the  main
ethnic  groups  (the  Kinh,  Hoa and Khmer)  together  with  a  composite  category for  ethnic minorities  that
traditionally  live in the  Central Highlands,  and another  for those  that originate  in the Northern  Uplands.
The  relevant  details  are  summarized  in  Table  2,  along  with  a  listing  of ethnic  groups  by  composite
category.
.. . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........
Poverty headcount  Expenditure/capita,  Household size  Sample size  % of
(%  of people)  '000 dong,  1998 prices  (weighted)4 pop.
1993  1998  1993  1998  1993  1998  1993  1998
Vietnam overall  55  36  2,043  2,751  4.97  4.71  4,799  5,999
Kinh  52  30  2,105  2,899  4.86  4.60  4,145  5,030  83.9
Hoa (Chinese)  11  8  3,843  5,119  6.55  5.18  89  121  2.0
Khmer  70  57  1,521  1,882  5.44  5.33  89  122  2.0
Central  Highland  Minorities'  92  91  1,021  1,090  6.28  5.79  103  167  2.8
Northem  Upland Minorities2 84  73  1,323  1,594  5.33  5.31  373  560  9.3
Notes:  1.  Central Highland minorities:  Ba-Na, Co-Ho,  E-De, Gie-Tieng,  Hre,  Ma, Ra Glai,  Xo-Dang.
2. Northem  Upland minorities:  Dao, Hmong,  Muong, Nung, Tay, Thai, San Diu, Dan Chay, Tho..
3. 132 households coded as belonging to 'Other'  ethnic minorities in  VLSS93 and 39 households belong to the other
category in  VLSS98 have been sub-divided between the last two groups in  this table using the regional and religion
variables.  Details are available from the authors on request.  The categories  may not be strictly comparable  between
1993 and  1998.
4. Unweighted sample size: Kinh:  5,172.  Hoa:  131.  Khmer. 95.  Central  Highland  minorities:  193.  Northem  Upland
minorities:  411.
Sources:  VLSS93  and VLSS98.
This disaggregation,  crude as it may be, is helpful.  The data in Table  2 show clearly that the poorest group
consists of the "Central Highland minorities."  Their expenditure  per capita  was VND11.02  million in  1993,
barely rising to VNDI.09 million by  1998; this stagnation  meant that the Central Highland minorities  saw
their relative  position  fall,  with an expenditure  level  that was half the  national average  in  1993 but  little
more than a third of the national average by  1998.  The poverty headcount for this group  went from 92% in
1993  to  91%  in  1998.  Having  missed  the  economic  boom  of  the  1990s,  it  is  not  surprising  that
dissatisfaction,  which  was also  related  to  land and  religious  conflicts,  bubbled  over  into  the  significant
demonstrations by ethnic people  that took place in several places in the Central Highlands in February 2001
(Economist Intelligence  Unit 2001).
Page 4It is  possible to get a more complete picture of the distribution of per capita expenditures  by ethnic category
from  the  kernel  densities  shown  in Figure  2.  These  may  be  thought  of as  histograms  that  have  been
smoothed  in order to iron out minor irregularities  in the data (Deaton  1997;  StataCorp  1999), and so  draw
the eye to the essential  features of the distributions.  In  Figure 2a, the kernel  densities  for the Kinh,  Hoa,
and  Khmer  are  shown.  The  density  for  the  Hoa  stands  out:  its  peak  is  far  to  the  right  of the  other
distributions,  and there is a wider variation  in per capita expenditures than the  other four categories.  The
slightly  bi-modal distribution  is due to the heavy, if partial, concentration of Hoa households  in large urban
areas,  particularly  in the  Southeast.  In  contrast,  the distribution  of expenditures  for Khmer  households,
who live primarily in the Mekong Delta, has a peak just below the GSO/World Bank poverty line, and most
of the  observations  are highly  concentrated  in that  vicinity.  This  indicates  that  as long  as those regions
continue  to benefit  from general  economic  growth, a large  proportion of the  Khmer should  move out of
poverty in the next five years or so.
Figures 2a and 2b:  Kernel densities of  per capita expenditure for 1998, based on VLSS98  data.
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Page 5Figure 2b shows the kernel densities  for the Central Highland and Northern Upland minorities, with that for
the  Kinh  included  for  comparison  purposes.  The  distributions  of  expenditures  for  Northern  Upland
minorities,  and especially for Central  Highland minorities,  are even  more highly concentrated than for the
Khumer.  The mode  of the  density for the Northern  Upland  minorities  is,  however,  relatively  close to  the
poverty line, indicating that they are also likely to benefit from equitable economic growth.  In contrast,  the
Central Highland minorities  are considerably poorer in expenditure  terms than the other four categories,  as
both their density in Figure 2b and the poverty headcounts  in Table 2 confirm.  Exceptionally rapid growth
and/or  other special measures  will  therefore be needed if poverty is  to be reduced significantly among the
ethnic minorities indigenous to the Central Highlands.
(ii) Schooling
Although a finer breakdown  by ethnic group is not possible using VLSS data, one can get greater precision
using the 3% enumeration sample  of the 1999  Population and Housing  Census.  While the  Census data do
not provide  information  on incomes  or expenditure,  they  do allow  one  to construct  gross and  net  school
enrollment rates for the  12 ethnic groups for which there  are at least 1,000 observations  in the enumeration
sample.  School enrollment rates are usually highly correlated with income, and may therefore be used as a
rough and ready indication of the standard of living in a community.
Table 3  shows primary  school enrolment rates by sex for each of the twelve  ethnic  groups with more than
1,000  children  of primary  school  age  in  included  in  the  Census  3%  sample.  By  the  standards  of
comparably  poor  countries,  the primary.school  net enrolment  rates  (NER)  in  Vietnam  are  quite  high
(91%).6  However,  primary NERs  are bejow 70% for  5 ethnic groups:  the Ba-na,  Gia-rai,  Xo-dang  in the
Central  Highlands  and the Dao and the Hmnong  in the Northern  Uplands,  as Table 3 shows.  In addition to
poverty  and  remoteness,  one  of fEe  factors  discouraging  ethnic  minority  children  in these  groups  from
attending  primary  school  is  lack  of inistruction  in  ethnic  minority  languages  (especially  in  the  lowest
grades).
Ethnic Group  Gross  Net  Net (Boys)  Net (girs)  Sample Size
Kinh  113.6  93.4  93.5  93.4  229,503
Hoa  122.6  93.7  94.5  92.9  2,361
Khmer  114.5  76.3  77.3  75.3  3,879
Central Highlands:
Gia-rai  126.3  66.4  67.6  65.1  1,695
Ba-na  108.9  57.8  55.0  60.4  1,335
Xo-dang  139.3  62.2  64.7  59.3  1,233
Northern Uplands:
Tay  135.4  94.7  94.9  94.4  11,079
Thai  135.5  83.9  87.2  80.5  5,004
Muong  133.4  94.5  94.9  94.0  3,851
Nung  136.6  89.3  89.7  88.9  5,010
Hmong  80.5  41.5  51.5  31.5  4.090
Dao  126.4  71.4  73.7  68.8  4,091
All  115.4  91.4  91.7  91.0  280,262
Notes:  To be consistent with Vietnamese school enrolment  procedures, these enrolment  rates have been computed using calendar year of birth
as stated in  the Census files to determine whether or not a child is of primary or lower secondary age.  The  net enrolment rate can fall
by several percentage points if the child's actual age (e.g., 6 to 10 years old for primary school)  is used.
Gross enrollment rate = total enrolments in  level X /  children  eligible to attend level X.
Net enrollment rate = total enrolments in level X of children eligible to attend level X / children of age eligible to attend  level X.
Source:  Based on 3%  enumeration  sample of  1999 Census
6 Primary school in Vietnam  extends for five years, from roughly the ages of 6 through  10, although eligibility to attend primary
school is determined on the basis of the calendar year of a  child's birth and not on his or her age.
7Only 10 of the 334 primary schools surveyed in the VLSS98 taught any  lessons in ethnic minority languages.  Of these  10 primary
schools, 7 were  in the Mekong Delta or Southeast.
Page 6On average,  primary school enrolments  are relatively balanced between the sexes,  with an overall primary
NER of 91.7%  for boys  and 91.0%  for girls.  Again this blurs  differences  at the level  of individual  ethnic
minorities:  for all groups except the Ba-na, primary net enrolments rates are slightly lower for girls than for
boys,  although  in  most  cases  the  difference  in  NER  is  small  and  not  statistically  significant.  Three
exceptions  to this rule stand out: girls'  primary NERs  substantially  lag those  for boys among three  ethnic
groups in the Northern Uplands: the Dao (-4.9%), the Thai (-6.7%) and,  in particular,  the Hmong (-20.0%).
Table 2 also shows that primary school gross enrolment rates (i.e. the number of pupils enrolled  in primary
school  divided by  the number  of children  eligible  to attend  primary  school)  are in  some  case very  high
indeed.  The implication  is that a substantial  proportion of Vietnamese children  are starting primary school
late, and are repeating grades  frequently;  this is especially true of most ethnic minority children.
Table 4 summarizes lower secondary school enrolment rates by ethnicity and sex.8 As expected, both gross
and net lower secondary school enrolments rates are much  lower than for primary school enrolment  rates.
For Vietnam  overall (in 1999),  the net enrolment rate falls from 91%  for primary school  to 60% for lower
secondary school.  At the lower secondary level a clear gap opens  up between the Kinh (65%) and all other
groups (52%  or less).  Five ethnic groups  - the Gia-rai,  Ba-na  and Xo-dang in the Central  Highlands,  and
the Hmong  and Dao in the north - have net enrolment rates at the lower secondary  level of less than 20%,
with that for the Hmong just under 5%.  Overall,  the lower secondary NER is essentially the  same for boys
and  girls,  but  this  hides  some  variation by  ethnic  group:  among  the  Hmong and  Xo-dang  girls'  lower
secondary  NERs  are at least  5% lower  than for boys,  while for  the Tay and Nung  the female  enrolment
rates are at least 5% higher than for boys.
.~~~~~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ,i  .1
Ethnic  Gross  Net  Net (Boys)  Net (girls)  Sample Size
Group
Kinh  80.6  64.8  65.5  64.0  185772
Hoa  71.0  51.7  50.4  53.1  1989
Khmer  35.9  22.5  23.8  21.2  3041
Central Highlands:
Gia-rai  37.1  14.9  15.2  14.5  1354
Ba-na  20.0  8.9  9.0  8.9  1024
Xo-dang  35.2  10.1  12.7  7.1  1071
Northern  Uplands:
Tay  77.0  51.0  47.1  55.2  9082
Thai  55.2  32.1  33.6  30.5  4402
Muong  76.7  52.3  50.8  53.9  3265
Nung  61.8  39.2  37.0  41.6  4055
Hmong  9.8  4.5  7.5  1.6  3092
Dao  20.3  11.8  11.9  11.8  3026
All  76.2  60.0  60.5  59.3  226649
Notes and Sources:  As for Table 3.
These findings on enrolment rates allow us to start to explore the extent to which different ethnic minorities
are assimilated with the Kinh majority.  If ethnic groups are classified according to the extent to which their
school enrolment rates are similar to the Kinh, one might reasonably argue that the Hoa, Tay, Muong, Nung
and  perhaps  Thai  are  assimilating  relatively  fast,  while  the  other  minorities  (the  Dao  and Hmong in the
Northern Uplands,  the Khmer  in the South, and all the Central  Highland Minorities)  are assimilating much
less rapidly.  If this speculation  is correct, then we  might expect  a relatively high  degree  of intermarriage
among  the  first  ("more  assimilated")  group than  among the  second  ("less  assimilated")  group.  We  now
examine this proposition.
Lower secondary school stretches for four years,  from approximately  age  11 until age  14.
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The  3%  Census  enumeration  sample,  but  not  the  VLSS  surveys,  allows  us  to  measure  the  extent  of
intermarriage  among  the  12  main ethnic  groups.9 The  results  are  summarized  in  Table  5.  The most
striking finding  is that Chinese are the most  likely to marry partners of a different  ethnic group; a third of
Chinese heads of household are married to a member of another ethnic  group, primarily  Kinh.  The Nung
and  the Tay are  also likely  to intermarry,  with one-in-four  Nung and  one-in-five  Tay heads  married  to a
partner from a different ethnic group.
Married to:
Ethnic Group  Member of Another  Kinh Partner  Sample Size
Ethnic Group  (unweighted)
Kinh  0.9  99.1  339,633
Hoa  33.3  30.1  3,283
Khmer  11.4  10.9  4,196
Central Highlands:
Gia-rai  1.2  0.6  1,872
Ba-na  1.4  0.3  1,440
Xo-dang  2.0  0.2  1,536
Northem Uplands:
Tay  19.1  12.0  15,161
Thai  6.4  2.6  5,816
Muong  10.2  7.6  4,957
Nung  25.0,,  12.1  6,562
Hmong  0.8  0.5  3,676
Dao  6.5  4.1  4,225
All Vietnam  2.5  1.1  399,573
Note: 134,566(23.6%) of household headsware  single, widowed, separated, or divorced.  9.5% of married household  heads are
female.
Source: Author's calculations based on 3% enumeration  sample of 1999 Census.
With the exception  of the Thai,  at least  10% of household heads  in  the more educated  ethnic groups  are
married to someone  from another ethnic group, typically Kinh.  This is an intermarriage rate comparable  or
higher than that of second-generation  Italian-Americans  and Jews in the United States  in the  middle of the
20'  century  (Economist  2001,  p.36).  This  suggests  that  the  cultural  and perhaps  economic  distance
between these groups and the Kinh majority is relatively modest; we might speculate that these groups have
embarked  on  a path  of economic  development  that  will lead to  "assimilation"  with  the  dominant group.
The Khmer may also fit into this mold, although less clearly.
In contrast,  the Thai appear  to have chosen  to keep  their distance  - a relatively  low rate of intermarriage,
particularly with Kinh partners - while emphasizing education.  In this respect  they are following  a similar
path to the (ethnically  similar) Tai in Xishuangbanna,  a region of southern China that abuts Vietnam.  The
Tai's  unwillingness  to  assimilate  mainstream  Han  culture  has  led to  an  increasing  degree  of economic
marginalization  (Hansen  1999).
The remaining  ethnic groups,  particularly  the Central Highland  minorities and the Hmong in the Northern
Uplands,  have very  low rates of intermarriage  with members of other groups.  It is perhaps surprising that
the Hmong and  the Dao,  who  live  in overlapping mountainous  areas  and belong to the  same  Kadai  sub-
group, intermarry very infrequently.  When the Dao do intermarry, it is most often with a Tay partner.
The low-intermarriage  groups  are  also the groups where  school  enrolment  rates are the lowest.  Whether
these groups  apartness  is a matter of choice,  or an unintended  consequence  of linguistic  and  geographic
barriers, is unclear.  We would, however, suggest that the most difficult challenge  of public policy towards
9These calculations  assume monogamous  marriages (de facto or dejure). Polygamy is known to have been common among affluent
members  of certain  ethnic groups  (such  as  the  Kinh  and  the  Hmong)  in the  past but  is  now  officially  prohibited.  None  of the
households  enumerated in the 1999 Census recorded polygamous marriages.
Page 8ethnic  groups is bringing  the  "less-assimilated"  groups  into the economic  mainstream;  most of the  "more-
assimilated"  ethnic  groups are already half-way there.
Some anthropologists  argue that it may be more socially acceptable  for a Tay, Nung or Dao man to marry a
woman  from  one of the  other northern  upland minorities,  than  to  marry  a Kinh  woman.  However  the
evidence  from the 3%  Census enumeration  survey  does not bear this  out:  more than half of the  Tay  and
Dao husbands, and almost half of the Nung husbands,  who have married an outsider have Kinh wives. 0
(iv)  Religion
A final aspect  of the  assimilation of different  ethnic groups into  Kinh society that can be examined using
the  1999  Census  is  that  of religion.  This  is  a sensitive  issue  in Vietnam.  The  protests in  the  Central
Highlands  by  ethnic  minority  groups  in early  2001  were  partly in  response  to  official  efforts  to  restrict
religious practice in the region, especially among the growing number of evangelical Protestants.
Article  70 of the  1992 Constitution  guarantees  all Vietnamese  citizens  freedom  of religion or non-belief,
but indirect controls and local restrictions often discourage  particular religious  groups (UN Economic  and
Social Council,  1998).  Furthermore, in the past, some religious groups (especially  Protestant Christians  in
the Central Highlands and Northern Uplands) have been accused of being aligned with organizations whose
aim  is  the  overthrow  of the  State  (Winrock  International,  1996);  or were  historically  associated  with
opposition  to  the  government  (for  instance  the  Cao  Dai).  Although  in recent  years  the  government's
attitude towards religion has becorne  noticeably  more relaxed, many defacto regulations  still exist so that
the  position  of many religious  communities  is best  described  as  one  in  which  "circumscribed  areas  of
freedom  are  emerging  within  a general  framework  of controls,  limitations  and  even  prohibitions"  (UN
Economic  and  Social  Council,  1998).  For  those  minority  groups  that  have  large  numbers  of religious
practitioners,  these  restrictions  are an important  source  of irritation  and  even  alienation from  the  central
authorities.
Table 6 shows the percentage  breakdown of professed religion observance at the time of the 1999 Census.'
More  than  three quarters  of people  in Vietnam  stated they had no  religion,  with Buddhism,  Christianity
(mainly  Catholicism),  Cai Daoism and Hoa Hao  (two indigenous  religions  that blend a number of oriental
and  occidental  beliefs  and practices)  and Islam accounting  for the remainder.  Some  of the smaller  ethnic
minorities are known to have their own, often animist-based,  religions and it is unclear how well these were
enumerated in the Census.
Ethnic  GrouD  ~No Religion  Buddhist  Christian  Other Religions
ung  877.7  10.9  7.9  3.3
Tay  99.3  0.3  0.1  0.0
Tha-i  8099.63  0.1  1  0.0
HaChinese)  74.7  22.7  2.4  0.2
Kh-e (Khmer)  37.4  62.3  0.2  0.1
Muong  98.4  0.1  1.4  0.0
Nung  98.0  1.6  0.2  0.0
Hmong  95.2  0.1  4.5  0.0
Dao  99.2  0.2  0.3  0.0
Gia-rai  80.3  0.1  19.6  0.0
Ba-na  52.2  0.0  47.8  0.0
Xo-dang  71.3  0.0  28.6  0.0
All  78.8  10.5  7.7  3.0
Note: 'Other  religions"  include  Cao Dai, Hoa  Hoa and Islam.
Source: Authors' calculations  from 3% Sample of 1999 Census
10  11% of Tay husbands are married Kinh wives (compared  to 4.8% with Nung wives) while  11.2% of Nung husbands have Kinh
wives (and a further 11.2% have Tay wives).  Among the Dao, of  the 6.2% of husbands who intermarry,  3.8% are married to Kinh
women, with a further  1.5% are married to Tay, Hoa or Muong wives.
" Note that the Census included two questions on religion, the first asking if an individual follows a religion with a second  follow-up
question inquiring further if he or she practices this religion.  Table 6 is based on responses to the first question.
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Buddhism is the most common religion,  followed closely by Christianity.  A significant  number of ethnic
groups,  particularly  in  the  Northern  Uplands,  profess  essentially  no  religion,  including  the  Tay,  Thai,
Muong, Nung, Dao and Hmong.
On the other hand a number of the Central Highland minorities count a high proportion of believers:  almost
half of the Ba-Na are Christian (mainly Protestants), as are substantial percentages  of the Xo-dang  and Gia-
rai.  A majority of the Khmer are practicing Buddhists.  Islam only  has a significant number  of adherents
among the  Cham, while Cao Daoism and Hoa Hao are practiced mainly  by the Kinh  living in the South-
East  and  Mekong  Delta.  Just  under  5%  percentage  of the  Hmong  are  Christian  (most  of whom  are
Protestants)  though  it seems  likely  that the Hmong's  traditions of spirit worship  have been overlooked  in
the Census data.
Government Policy Towards Minori.y Groups
To give some context to the subsequent  discussion,  we now briefly summarize  government policy towards
ethnic  minorities.  The  main  vehicle  for  implementing  government  policies  on  ethnic  minorities  is  the
Committee  for Ethnic  Minorities  in  Mountainous  Areas  (CEMMA).  This  is a  cabinet  level  committee,
established  in  1993,  charged with identifying,  coordinating,  implementing and monitoring  projects  geared
toward ethnic minority development.  CEMMA has a budget of VND7.9 trillion ($546 million), to be spent
on its main programs and projects over the five-year period through 2005; if realized, this would amount to
a substantial  $50 per ethnic minority household per year. However, since  1998 CEMMA has been criticized
for  various  instances  of corruption.  In  February  2001,  13  CEMMA  officials  were  disciplined  by  the
Communist Party for "violating regulations  on management"  (Cohen 2001);  the  following March,  the  1  1th
plenum of the Central  Committee  of the Party  disciplined  CEMMA chairman Hoang  Duc Nghi  (Xinhua
2001).  Margot Cohen  has  written that  "at the  heart of CEMMA's  failings  is a top-down  approach  [...]
Ethnic  minorities  rarely  participate  in  planning  development  projects,  and  rarely  know  what  they  are
entitled to once projects are implemented."
In addition, under Program  133,  the Ministry of Labor, Invalids  and  Social Affairs (MOLISA)  coordinates
a Hunger Eradication  and Poverty  Reduction  program that  is  designed to  combat  poverty by  providing
additional  resources  to  the  poorest  communes  in  the  country.  Given  the high  levels  of poverty  among
ethnic  minorities,  this  program  niecessarily  helps  ethnic  minority  households  disproportionately,  even
though  MOLISA's  list  of poor  communes  includes  many  in  lowland  and  midland  areas.  The  main
weakness of this program  is that it is not  sufficiently targeted.  By spreading  its largesse - about VND410
billion  ($28 million)  annually  - so thinly,  it provides  only limited  help  to the poorest households,  which
dissipates  its effectiveness  as  an anti-poverty  program.  The bluntness  of the  targeting  is clear  from the
numbers  compiled by van de Walle  (2001).  She  reports that, in  1998, 71% of the richest rural communes
had  a poverty  alleviation  program,  compared  to  89%  for the  poorest  rural  communes  (Table  17);  and
poverty alleviation  programs  touched villages  with 84% of the rural poor and 75%  of the non-poor (Table
7).  Meantime,  large  numbers  of poor people  living  in non-poor communes  are  excluded from receiving
many benefits (Minot and Baulch, 2001).
A  wide range  of government  interventions  designed  to help  the ethnic  minorities  have  been  introduced
since  1993.  These  interventions  include:  subsidizing  the  cost of transporting  essential  goods  to remote
areas;  funds  for resettlement  and  sedentarisation;  subsidies for  salt, reforestation  funds,  the provision  of
potable water, road maintenance  and upgrading, the provision of livestock and seedlings to farmers;  gifts of
radios  to remote  households,  subsidies  for connecting  villages  to the national  grid, and  the provision  of
educational  scholarships.
Govemment  policy is not,  however, universally  supportive  of ethnic minorities.  On the one hand,  there  is
official  interest in maintaining  (bao ton) and  developing  (phat huy) cultural  identity, particularly  dances,
foLlkore  and  modes  of dress.  On the  other  hand,  the  standard  textbooks  tend  to  emphasize,  and even
glorify,  Kinh culture and history.  Similarly the  expansion of education  has,  at last, led to a rapid rise in
Page 10enrollment  rates  for  ethnic  minority children.  However,  Vietnamese  remains  the  dominant  language  of
instruction,  and  most  officially  sanctioned  textbooks  are  in  Vietnamese.  There  is  an  ongoing  tension
between  the  willingness  to  accept  differences  (cong nhan),  and  cultural  assimilation  or  Vietnamization
(dong hoa).
The  most important rural  development policies have not helped,  and may have hurt, many ethnic minority
households.  The government  discourages  drug production, which reduces  the income of some growers  in
the northem mountains.  Agricultural  extension and research tends  to favor lowland rice over upland crops
(Huy and Dai  1999, p.13).  The  formalization of land rights  has tended  to squeeze slash-and-bum  farmers,
especially  as traditional  land and  forest use rights are poorly defined  and frequently  not recognized by the
formal  legal system  (Huy and  Dai  1999).  Govermment subsidies have encouraged  people to move  to  the
"New Economic Zones"  in the Central Highlands.  Even though only half of the (mostly Kinh)  migrants to
the  Zones  have  stayed  there,  the  in-migration  has  contributed  to  tension  with  the  indigenous  ethnic
minorities in the Central Highlands (especially over land).
There is strong interest  among donors  and non-govermmental  organizations  in projects that would alleviate
poverty.  These  efforts  have  the  effect  of helping  ethnic  minority  households,  although  not  explicitly.
There  are  also a  number  of projects,  or  components  of projects,  that  are explicitly  geared  toward ethnic
minorities.'2 With NGO  support,  an Ethnic Minority  Forum (and  now working group)  was established  in
1993,  and  serves as  a locus  for sharing  experiences  and  lessons  leamed  from the  many efforts  that are
geared towards ethnic  minority development.
Explaining  the Divergence  between Majority and Minority Living Standards
Why  are  Vietnam's  ethnic  minority  households  so  poor?  Following  other  studies  using  the  VLSS,  we
measure  material  living  standards  using  expenditure  per  capita.  So  our  question  becomes:  why  is
expenditure  per capita  so low, and growing  so slowly, among ethnic minority  households?  The  standard
economic explanations  may be grouped into two.
First,  people  may be poor if they  lack endowments.  The main  "factors  of production"  are  land, physical
capital  and human capital  (education).  To  the extent that a household  lacks these  endowments  then it is
likely to be relatively poor.  Table  7 summarizes  some of the main variables  on household  endowments.  It
shows that although ethnic minority households  tend  to have a relatively  large quantity of land, this land is
generally  of poorer  quality  (reflected  in part by  the  relatively  low holdings  of irrigated  land).'3 Ethnic
minority  households are likely to be poorly endowed  with capital, as reflected by their lack access to credit
and lower receipts of remittances;  in rural areas, the value of farm tools owned by Kinh households  is twice
as high as the value of those owned by ethnic minority households.  As would be expected from the school
enrolment  data,  ethnic  minority  households  also  have  lower  levels  of  education  than  the  Kinh-Hoa
majority.  For households that remain in farming,  it may not make sense to acquire  more education, but the
modest  level  of education  also  serves  to  reduce  the  number  of economic  opportunities  open  to  them
elsewhere  in the country.
Second,  people may  be poor because  their  knowledge,  customs  or culture  mean that they  do  not use the
available  factors of production as  efficiently as possible;  or because they face discrimination,  and so would
have  more  difficulty  getting  a good job  than another  equivalently  qualified  individual.  Either of these
would  lead to the  same result,  which  is  low "returns  on characteristics."  For  instance,  a poorly educated
ethnic minority farmer may not be able to get a high return  on land because he or she does not know how to
cultivate  high-yielding  crop  varieties,  or because  the  local  agricultural  extension  agent  cannot  speak  the
local language  or never visits.
12  Examples:  UNDP-supported  Ethnic  Minority Development  project (VIE/94/013 - VIE/96/010);  UNDP/IFAD-supported  Ha Giang
Development  Project  for  Ethnic  Minority  (V1E96/027),  SlDA-supported  MRDP,  SIDA-supported  Viet  Nam-Sweden  Inter-Forest
(social forestry) Project, UNDP Regional  Project -Highland  People.
13  In  1992, rural Kinh  and Hoa households cultivated an average of724 m
2of"good quality"  land, of which  615 m
2was irrigated;  for
ethnic minorities  the overall figure was  178 m
2, of which just 62 m
2per household  was irrigated.  'Good quality" land is defined as
land that yields four tonnes  or more of paddy (or equivalent)  per hectare per year.
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Full sample  Full sample  Mixed communes only
Kinh-  Minor-  Kinh-  Minor-  Test  Kinh-  Minor-  Test
Hoa  ities  Hoa  ities  Hoa  ities
Sample size (weighted)  4,234  565  5,261  738  931  575
Expenditure per capita, '000 dong p.a.  2,142  1,299  2,952  1,536  0.00  2,742  1,604  0.00
Prop. hhs receiving foreign remittances  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.01
Prop. hhs receiving domes.  Remittances  0.20  0.11  0.23  0.09  0.00  0.20  0.10  0.00
Land area cultivated,  m' *  5,004  8,002  5,469  11,747  0.00  7,628  12,035  0.00
of  which, area of
Irrigated land  **  1,531  569  2,704  2,403  0.52  3,176  2,886  0.65
Perennial crops **  682  959  1,079  1,454  0.39  1,164  1,284  0.61
Forest land **  170  1,112  505  4,630  0.00  1,044  5,027  0.00
Value of farm tools/household, '000 dong**  486  216  425  213  0.00  484  216  0.00
Years of education of head  6.58  4.72  7.36  5.53  0.00  7.36  6.04  0.01
Years of  ed of best-educated  member  9.04  6.57  9.36  6.94  0.00  9.21  7.55  0.00
Notes:  * In January  1998 prices.  Weighted by household weights and size.  i  Rural households only  Mixed commnunes  are those with sampled
households both from the Kinh-Hoa  majority, and from ethnic minority groups.
Sources:  VLSS93 and VLSS98.
Ethnic minority people have low endowments,  and poor returns  to characteristics,  in part because many of
them  live  in  remote  areas,  and hence  are  disconnected  from  the rest  of the  economy.  Traditionally,
remoteness  is seen  as a geographic  concept.  Households  living  in remote  areas  find it expensive  to buy
inputs  or to  bring  their  goods  to  market.  If the  density  of population  is  low,  it  is  harder  to  provide
schooling  and other amenities.  But remoteness  may  also be  thought of as a social concept,  so that some
households  may  be  distant  from their  neighbors  because  of barriers  of language  or culture.  The ethnic
minority  households  in  rural  areas  that  do  not  speak  Vietnamese  have  per  capita  expenditures  (1.074
million dong) that are only three-fifths  as  high as those of their Vietnamese-speaking  counterparts  (1.641
million  dong),  according  to  the  VLSS98.  Many  minority  groups  also  feel  remote  from  the  process  of
policy- and decision-making;  the recent  (April  2001)  elevation of Nong Duc Manh,  an ethnic  Tay, to the
position of General  Secretary  of the  Communist  Part,  is  an exception  to this  rule.  Remoteness  is more
likely  to  be  a problem  if there  are  additional  barriers  - administrative,  social  or other  - that prevent
households from migrating in response to better opportunities  elsewhere.
Several measures of remoteness are summarized  in Table 8.  Children from ethnic minorities have to travel
further to school.  Their parents  have  to travel  further to  go to a market, hospital,  post office,  or factory.
Their families are less likely to live in a village  or commune that is served by public transport,  electricity or
a telephone.
Although they use a somewhat different  vocabulary,  Vietnamese  social scientists typically point to similar
causes of poverty among the ethnic minorities.  Ethnologist Bui Van Dao (personal  communication)  argues
that  ethnic  minorities  are  persistently  poor because  of "objective  reasons"  (isolated  villages,  poor  soils,
inadequate  water,  unsuitable  climate),  "subjective  reasons"  (low educational  levels,  population  pressure,
shortage  of capital,  slow technical  change),  and "institutional  reasons"  (government  policy  insufficiently
targeted, overlapping programs, top-down administration).
Pham  and Tuan  (1999)  come  up  with a similar list, but  they add that  the  socio-political  institutions  and
customs  of ethnic minorities  are "still backward,"  and that  "subversive  forces"  have "abused"  religion and
ethnicity  "to destroy national unity."  Implicit in this diagnosis is that the solution is for ethnic minorities to
assimilate.  This  is  the  most  widely  held  view  in  official  circles.  The reference  to  national  unity  is
important,  because a number of the ethnic minority groups  worked closely with the Americans  during the
war in the  1  960s and 1  970s, and their political reliability is still considered to be suspect.
Others have  argued  that ethnic minorities  are poor because  they have been trapped  in a downward  spiral:
population  growth  puts  pressure  on  the  natural  carrying  capacity  of  the  uplands,  which  leads  to
environmental  degradation  and poverty  (Jamieson,  Cuc  and Rambo,  1998).  This  in turn  leads  to  social,
cultural  and  economic  marginalization  and  increased  dependence  on  non-local support systems  (NGOs,
Page 12government  subsidies),  which make  it even harder  for  them to  rise  out of poverty.  Jamieson,  Cuc and
Rambo  stress  this  last  component.  Decision  making,  they argue,  is too centralized  and remote.  It also
occurs without adequate  representation of local people, which in turn fuels distrust and misunderstanding.
Full sample  Mixed communes only
Kinh +  Minorities  Test  Kinh +  Minorities  Test
Hoa  Hoa
Prop. With primary school in  village  0.35  0.43  0.43  0.38  0.43  0.66
Km. to nearest primary school  1.4  2.0  0.02  1.8  1.9  0.70
Km. to nearest lower secondary school  1.9  3.0  0.01  2.5  2.6  0.83
Km. to nearest upper secondary school  5.0  8.0  0.03
Km. to district center  8.8  18.9  0.00  9.1  16.5  0.04
Km. to nearest post office  4.2  10.1  0.01  5.2  6.7  0.12
Prop. With factory within 10 km  0.63  0.48  0.13  0.55  0.54  0.95
Prop. With any market in the commune  0.48  0.19  0.00  0.38  0.21  0.03
Km. to closest market  1.5  5.8  0.00  2.4  4.0  0.01
Prop. With electricity  0.96  0.70  0.00  0.95  0.83  0.04
Prop. With public transport available  0.48  0.31  0.05  0.41  0.31  0.41
Prop. With phone in  commune  0.66  0.29  0.00  0.54  0.33  0.06
Km. to dosest phone  1.4  8.2  0.01  2.7  4.5  0.14
Km.tonearesthospital  8.3  13.6  0.06  8.5  11.2  0.15
Proportion living in  villages where births  0.19  0.60  0.00  0.33  0.53  0.06
are usually at home
Souses: VLSS93 and VLSS98.
Much less has been written about how minority people characterize  and explain their own poverty.  As part
of a participatory poverty  assessment,  a recent study in Lao Cai found that people place  great emphasis on
the lack of natural resources,  particularly  high quality land and  reliable water supplies,  in explaining their
own poverty (Vietnam-Sweden  2000).  Bui Minh Dao also argues that many ethnic groups explain poverty
on the basis of superstitions (tam linh).  People become rich thanks to spiritual support, or are poor because
they are encountering  a bad time (van han).
While a listing of the possible  causes of poverty is certainly useful,  such an exercise  does not give a good
sense of what the most influential  factors might be.  In an important study based on the VLSS93  data, van
de  Walle  and  Gunewardena  (2001)  examine  the  relative  contributions  of characteristics,  the  return  to
characteristics,  and geography  in explaining  why ethnic  minority households  are poorer  than  the rest of
society.  They  use the Blinder-Oaxaca  decomposition  (described  below) to  determine  the  extent to which
the lower expenditure  levels of minority households  is due to the fact that they have weaker characteristics
(i.e.  lower  educational  levels,  poorer  quality  land),  and  how  much  is  due  to  lower  returns  on  these
characteristics.  Using  expenditure  regressions estimated  for households  living in rural  areas  of Northern
and Central Vietnam,  they find that about half of the difference  in expenditure  per capita between the two
groups is due to differences in their characteristics  and endowments,  with the remainder attributable to the
lower "return to characteristics"  obtained by minority households.  Some writers interpret the portion of the
expenditure  differential  due to  "return to characteristics"  as  a measure  of discrimination.  However this  is
not  entirely  satisfactory,  because  the  differences  in  characteristics  between  majority  and  minority
households may themselves  be the result of unequal  treatment in the past.  Nor is discrimination  the only
possible  explanation  of the  expenditure  differential;  other unobserved  factors,  including  cultural  history,
could play a role.
Do the findings of van de Walle and Gunewardena still hold?  They used data from 1993, when restrictions
on in-country migration had only just been eased, and were still of some importance.  In the next section we
apply their model to the VLSS98 data using both the  simple majority-minority  split and the disaggregation
into  composite  categories  (Kinh,  Hoa,  Central  Highland  Minorities,  and Northern  Uplands  Minorities)
developed  above.  We  find that the  differences  in  "returns  to  characteristics"  by ethnicity  are  generally
stronger than they were in 1993;  certainly they remain very important.
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In order to "explain"  the gap between  the living standards of majority and minority households,  we begin
by estimating regressions in which the dependent  variable is the  log of expenditure per capita (InE)  and the
independent  variables  consist  of household  and  community  level  endowments  and  characteristics  (X).
Formally,  we regress
ln(E,Vk)  =  X-k P 1 3ik + Tk + £ijk
where the observations are for the i'th household  in the j'th ethnic group in the kth commune.  Here the Thk
are fixed,  commune-level  effects and  Eijk  is  a random error  with zero  mean.  Separate  regressions  may be
estimated for each  ethnic group.  For instance,  indexing the Kinh and Hoa majority  with a and the  ethnic
minorities with b, it can be shown that:
In  Ea- InEf =(Xa  -Xb)la  +Xa  (fa  -8b)
Total difference = Characteristics + Structure
where  the  Ing  terms  represent  the  mean  log  of  expenditure  per  capita  and  the  Xi give  the  mean
characteristics  of each  group.  This  is the  Blinder-Oaxaca  decomposition  (Blinder  1973;  Oaxaca  1973),
which  separates  the  differences  in  expenditure  per  capita  into  the  part  that  is  due  to  the  different
characteristics  of the two groups, and another component  that reflects  "structural"  differences  between  the
two groups.  Note  that the  decomposition  shown here uses  the parameters  for group a, but this choice is
arbitrary.  One  could equally  well use  the parameters  from the  equations  estimated  for  group  b, and  this
will  generally  give  a  different  decomposition.  When  fixed  effects  are  included  (the  rljk  terms)  in  the
regressions,  they drop out of the decomposition provided that the equations for each group are estimated  for
communes  where there  are both  majority  and  minority households  - in our terms,  the  "mixed  commune
sample."
Our  regression  results  are  set  out  in  Appendix  1 for the  full  sample,  and  Appendix  2  for  the  mixed-
commune  sample  (which  includes  only the  48 communes  with both  majority  and  minority  households).
The  dependent  variable  is the  log of per capita  expenditure.  Separate  equations  are estimated,  using the
STATA  statistical  package,  for the  Kinh and Hoa majority  and  for ethnic  minority households.'4 In each
case we  estimate  a version  of the  equation  with  commune-level  fixed  effects,  and another  without these
effects.  The regressions  are weighted by the inverse of the probability that a household  is sampled and they
also account for clustering  and stratification  of the  1998 VLSS (see Stata Corp 1999, Vol.4, pp.18-30).
There  is clear evidence that the minority and majority regressions are structurally different,  in the sense that
at least some of the coefficients  are not the  same in the two cases.  For the full data set, a Chow test of the
equality of coefficients  is rejected  at the  1%  level both for the case  of no fixed  effects (F(20,164)=14.09)
and when there are fixed effects  (F(20,164) = 2.75);  in the latter case  we are testing  for the equality of all
the  coefficients  except  for the  commune  fixed  effects  dummies.  When the  sample  is reduced  to  those
communes that include both majority and minority households,  the Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of
equal coefficients at the  1%  level when there are no fixed effects (F(21,18)  = 6.29), but when fixed effects
are included,  the equality of the non-commune  coefficients is only rejected at the 5% level (F(21,18)=2.64).
This hints at the possibility  that much of the explanation  for the differences  in per capita expenditure  level
between majority and minority households is due to the fixed location effects.
Further  evidence  that  the factors  that influence  Kinh-Hoa  households  differ  from  those that  affect  ethnic
minority households  comes from estimates  of multiple  adaptive regression  spline (MARS)  models.  These
models  allow  for non-linearities  as  well  as  interactions  among  the  variables  in  the  models,  but  aim  to
identify parsimonious sets of basis functions (Friedman,  1991).  Separate  MARS models were estimated  for
Kinh-Hoa,  and for ethnic minority households and these yielded very different models (see Appendix  3 for
details).  For Kinh-Hoa  households,  the MARS  model shows (among  other things)  that education has  the
most  dramatic  effect  on  living  standards  for those  who  have  little  or no  land.  For  the  ethnic  minority
14 We also estimated  separate equations  for Urban Kinh and Urban Hoa; and for rual Kinh and Hoa, rural Khmer, rural Central
Highland Minorities,  and rural Northem Upland Minorities.  The results are not reported here, but were used in the decompositions
reported in Table 7 below.
Page 14households, the MARS model shows that the profitability of land is closely associated with complementary
family labor inputs; the ethnic  minorities need large families to make their land productive.
By and large the regressions  in Appendices  1 and 2 accord with our prior expectations.  Larger households
have  lower  per capita  expenditure  levels; both  for minority  and  majority households,  an extra household
member  is associated with  a drop in per capita  expenditure  of about 7%.  Having a higher proportion  of
adults  in  the  household  also  raises  per  capita  expenditures,  an  effect  that  is  significantly  stronger  for
majority  than minority  households  (as may be  seen from  the "p, eq.  Coeff."  column,  which gives the p-
values  for  a  test  of coefficient  equality;  where  the  coefficients  differ  between  majority  and  minority
households,  they are shown in bold face).
Education,  as proxied by the number of years of education of the best-educated  household member who is
not in school, is also a significant predictor of expenditures,  but the results differ depending on whether the
full sample,  or only the sample  of households  in mixed communes  is used.  Using the full sample,  the
relative return to education (as measured  by the percentage  change in expenditure  per capita  relative to a
change  in the numbers of years of education achieved  by the best-educated  household  member)  is higher
for minority  than majority households,  up to 7 years of education. Beyond that point the relative return  to
education is slightly higher for majority households.  However, when one confines the sample to only those
living in mixed  communes,  then  the relative  return to education  is higher for majority  households.'5 A
plausible interpretation  is that education brings a high return to ethnic minority households  when they also
are  free  to  migrate,  an  effect  that  is best  seen when  using  the  full  sample.  On the  other  hand  when
migration is limited  (for legal,  linguistic,  institutional  or cultural  reasons)  then it is  more difficult to find
profitable  outlets  for  additional  education.  Thus  the  efficacy  of education  as  a  way  to  raise  the  living
standards  of ethnic  minorities  depends  fundamentally  on  the  degree  to  which  they  are  geographically
mobile and are willing to become assimilated.
The quality of education  received  by children  from ethnic  minority groups may  also be  poorer; in  1998
their curriculum was shorter while the instruction is most often in Vietnamese (a foreign language for many
minority children).  It is plausible  that  minority  children  need to have  at least  several  years  of schooling
before  they  are  able  to  acquire  the  language  and  other  skills  needed  for  inclusion  into  the  economic
mainstream.
Finally, when the sample is confined to households  in ethnically  mixed communes,  access to land appears
to  play  a  bigger  role,  especially  for  minority  households.  Minority  households,  when  asked,  tend  to
emphasize  the  importance  of land  as  a  cause  of poverty  (see  Vietnam-Sweden  2000).  The  regression
results  in Appendix 2 help one to understand  why this might be so.  Confining the sample to households  in
ethnically mixed communes,  and allowing  for fixed effects,  an extra hectare  of irrigated land is  associated
with  additional  expenditure  per  capita of approximately  2  million VND, both for  majority and  minority
households.  While  an extra hectare  of irrigated  land would  raise  the per  capita expenditure  of a typical
Kinh-Hoa household by 13%,  it would boost expenditures  for a minority household by 25% on average.  It
is hardly surprising, then, that ethnic minority households put more emphasis on access to land as a way out
of poverty.
In Table 9 we present the main results of our decomposition  analysis. As explained above, this decomposes
the sources of differences  in per capita expenditure  levels between pairs of ethnic groups into a component
that  is due  to different  characteristics  (age,  education,  land,  gender,  location,  etc.)  and a component  that
may be  interpreted  as  reflecting different  "returns to characteristics."  To interpret  the table,  consider the
first line:  the difference  in predicted per capita expenditures  between the Kinh-Hoa majority and minority
groups  is VND  1,173,000  (in  the prices  of January  1998).  Of this  difference,  44%  is because  minority
households  have  less education,  fewer  remittances,  and  other characteristics  than the Kinh-Hoa majority;
the remaining 56%  is attributable  to differences  in returns to those characteristics.  So if the characteristics
of minority households could be boosted up to the level of  the majority, then almost half of the expenditure
gap  would  disappear.  However,  there  would  still  be a  substantial  gap  because  of the lower  "returns  to
5 A similar effect was found by Van de Walle and Gunewardena (2000) using the 1993 VLSS.
Page 15characteristics"  of ethnic minorities:  even if mninority households had  the same characteristics  as the Kinh-
Hoa majority, they would still be substantially poorer.
Reference equaeon  Per capita  d  of difference due  % due to  Number of
expenditure  to different  different  observations
(000s  1998 VND)  characteristics  "retums to
of reference group  characteristics"
1. RAl  Vietnam  Kinh-Hoa  2,651  44  56  5,294
Other minorities  1,478  31  69  698
2. ARI  Vietnam  Kinh-Hoa  2,456  45  55  993
(mixed)  Other minorities  1,563  29  72  510
3. ACI  Vietnam  Kinh-Hoa  2,456  66  34  993
(mixed, fixed)  Other minorities  1,563  54  46  510
6. Rural areas  Kinh-Hoa  2,254  29  71  4,377
Other minorities  1,460  38  62  679
5. Rural areas  Kinh-Hoa  2,254  28  72  4,377
Central Highland  Min.  1,012  34  66  191
6. Rural areas  Kinh-Hoa  2,254  26  74  4,377
Northem  Upland  Min.  1,551  16  84  402
7. Urban areas  Kinh  4,249  -80  180  1,484
Hoa  5,426  -61  161  112
Notes:  For each pairwise comparison,  the decomposition based on the Kinh-Hoa  (or, for urban areas, the Kinh) equation is  reported first,
and the results based on the minority equation follows on the next line.  The per capita expenditures  are geometric mean values.
(Mixed)  =  regressions  based on data from communes  where there were  both minority and non-minority households.
(Fixed) =  regressions  included community fixed effects.
Sources:  Based on VLSS98.
The  magnitude  of the  components  due  to  different  characteristics  and  "returns  to  characteristics"  are
substantially different depending on which group  is used as the reference  and which sample is used.  If the
sample  is  confined  to  those  communes  where  there  are  both  Kinh-Hoa  and  minority  households  (the
"mixed" communes),  we again find that about 45% of the expenditure per capita differential  is attributable
to  differences  in  characteristics.  However  when  the  equation  is  estimated  with  commune  fixed  effects
(section  3 of Table 9), almost two thirds of the  difference in per capita expenditure  is due  to differences  in
characteristics.  In  other words,  when  we  compare Kinh-Hoa  with  minority  households  within  a  given
commune, much of the gap between the groups is due to such factors as differences  in education.  Minority
households  are  thus poor in part  because  they lack education and other assets,  but  also because  they are
disproportionately  located in poorer communes.
Only  19 of the households surveyed by the VLSS98 consisted of ethnic minority households  in urban areas
(out of a total urban sample of 1,200 urban households).  So it may make more sense to confine the sample
to rural  areas and to compute  the Blinder-Oaxaca  decomposition  for this subset.  The results  are shown in
sections 4-6 of Table 9.  For minority households  overall, and for the  Central Highland Minorities,  about a
third  of the  differences  in per capita  expenditure  is attributable  to  differences  in  characteristics  such  as
education  or age.  This proportion  is  closer to a fifth  for Northern  Upland minority  groups;  even if this
group had the  same characteristics  as the Kinh-Hoa  majority,  four fifths of the per capita expenditure  gap
would remain.1 6
Table 9 also reveals an interesting result when the living standards of the urban Kinh and the urban Chinese
are  decomposed.  The  Chinese  are  more  affluent,  but  actually have  lower  levels  of education  and other
observable  expenditure-raising  characteristics  than  do  the  Kinh.  Thus  the  difference  in  per  capita
expenditure  between  the  two  groups  is entirely  due  to  the  higher  returns  to  characteristics  that  Chinese
households  enjoy.  Formally,  our  model  must  be  missing  some  important,  and  possibly unobservable,
determinant  of expenditures:  an obvious  candidate  is the strength of business bonds  and mutual  aid within
the Chinese community.
16 The Khmer have been excluded from our decomposition analysis due to the small  number (95) of Khmer included in the VLSS98,
together with problems of missing data for some of the Khmer households that were sampled.
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Walle  and  Gunewardena  (2001)  reached  broadly  similar  conclusions  using the  VLSS93  - albeit  with
greater weight  on "returns to  characteristics".  We should, however,  add that their results are  not directly
comparable  with ours because  Van de  Walle  and Gunewardena  used a slightly different  set of regressors
and  excluded  households  living  in urban  areas  plus the  Southeast and  Mekong  Delta regions  from their
sample.
Overall this analysis has an important,  if somewhat abstract,  implication.  If our concern  is to close the gap
between  minority  and  majority  living standards,  while  maintaining  ethnic  identities,  then  it will  not be
sufficient  simply  to  improve  minority  education  or provide  minority  households  with  more  land.  Our
regression  analysis  shows  that  minority  households  appear  to  generate  their  expenditure  levels  in  a
qualitatively  different way,  which means that anti-poverty programs that are geared to minority groups will
in  general  have  to  look  different  from  those  geared  to  the  majority.  This  will  presumably  require
considerable  amounts of input from  minority  groups  themselves  ("empowerment")  and from  those  who
have a thorough knowledge  of ethnic minority societies.
Summary and Conclusions
We conclude  by drawing together the  main strands of our analysis  and  examining  their implications  for
ethnic minority  policies in Vietnam.  Using data from the  1998 Vietnam Living Standards  Survey, we have
shown  clearly  that Kinh  and Hoa ("majority")  households  have  substantially  higher  living  standards  (as
measured  by per capita  expenditure)  than ethnic  minority households.  This gap  is also reflected  in lower
school  enrolment  rates,  higher  fertility  and  poorer  access  to  health  services  by  minority  households.
However,  ethnic minority households do not appear to be more malnourished than the population at large.
The  sample  size  of the  VLSS98  allows  a  crude  breakdown  of the  54  ethnic  groups  into  five  broad
categories:  the Kinh, Hoa, Khmer and two composite categories,  the "Central Highland Minorities"  and the
"Northern  Upland  Minorities."  Based  on  this  categorization,  we  find  that  both  the  Kinh  and  Hoa
experienced  rapid growth in their  per capita  expenditures  between  1993  and  1998,  and are now markedly
materially better off than before.  The Khmer and Northern Upland Minorities  also experienced reasonable
growth  in  per  capita  expenditures  during  the  1990s  and  now  have  expenditures  distributions  that  are
clustered at or just below the  poverty line.  This  indicates  that as long as economic  growth is distributed
equitably  in the  future,  rapid and significant  reductions  in poverty  are likely  to be  experienced  by these
groups  in the next five years  or so.  In  contrast,  the poorest  people are  members  of the  Central  Highland
Minorities, whose average level of expenditure per capita has remained stagnant since  1993.
For a finer disaggregation  of the ethnic  minorities, we  turned to  the 3%  enumeration  sample of the  1999
Census,  where we can distinguish  12 separate  ethnic  groups with  adequate  sample sizes.  The Census data
do not  include  information  on  expenditures  or incomes,  but  they  do  allow us to  compute  gross and  net
school enrolment rates and to examine patterns of intermarriage  and religious  observance.  Although school
enrolment rates  are generally  high in Vietnam,  they  are low for the Central  Highland Minorities,  and for
some of the Northern Upland  Minorities (especially the Hmong).  These are also  the ethnic groups that are
least likely to intermarry and are the most likely to be religious.  Since the high-intermarriage/non-religious
groups  (such  as  the  Tay  and  Nung,  and  to  a  lesser  extent the  Thai)  are  also the  groups  where  school
enrolments  are the highest,  we hypothesize  that these are the  ethnic  groups that have  assimilated the  most
with the Kinh and Hoa majority.
Why are ethnic minority households  so poor?  They may lack endowments (physical and human capital)  or
they may  have  low  returns  on  their  endowments,  perhaps  because  of discrimination,  or  for cultural  or
informational reasons.  The low endowments  and returns thereon are in turn partly due to the remoteness of
many ethnic minority households.  To tease out the relative importance of the main effects we estimate and
decompose  a set of expenditure  equations.  The results of these decompositions suggest that geographic and
cultural  remoteness  is  important.  More  importantly,  our  decomposition  analysis  shows  that  even  if
minority  households had the same endowments as Kinh households,  this would close no more  than a third
of the gap in living standards.  This  implies that, for some reason,  minority households have a lower return
to their endowments  than the Kinh and Hoa majority.
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economically and culturally, with the majority  group, and in effect obtain the same return on endowments
as the majority.  This  is the path that some ethnic groups,  such as the Tay, Nung,  and Muong appear to be
following quite successfully.  A second path, pursued by such groups as the Khmer and Thai (and possibly
the Dao),  is  to  integrate economically  with the  Kinh while retaining  their  own group's cultural  identity.
However, a third group of ethnic minorities, comprising almost all the minorities that are indigenous  to the
Central  Highlands  plus  the  Hmong  do  not  appear  to  be  benefiting  from  the  rising  living  standards
experienced by the majority.  If this third group of ethnic minorities is not to be  left further behind by the
growth process,  specific interventions need to be designed that are appropriate  to their circumstances,  needs
and  aspirations.  The Government  of Vietnam  and other development  agencies  should  recognize that that
the interventions  that work to reduce poverty among the Kinh and Hoa majority will not be effective for all
other minority groups.  Abstractly, the diversity of socioeconomic  development experiences of the different
ethnic groups calls for greater diversity  in the anti-poverty and other policy interventions  designed to assist
them.  Concretely,  this  will  require  far  more  input  from  ethnic  minority  households,  and  more
decentralization in anti-poverty programs, than has occurred up to now.
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Full sample,  no fixed effects  Full sample, fixed effects*
Kinh-Hoa  Minorty  Kinh-Hoa  Minority
Coeff-  Coeff-  p, eq.  Coeff-  Coeff-  p, eq.
icient  p  icient  p  Coeff.  Icient  p  icient  p  Coeff.
Dependent  variable  Ln. of per capita expenditure
Household Demographics
Household size  -0.037  o.o  -0.079  o.o0  0.00  -0.069  ooo  -0.075  o.o  0.48
Prop.  hh members 7-16  0.475  o.oo  0.609  o.o  0.31  0.454  o.o  0.487  o.oo  0.38
Prop.  hh members,  male over 16  0.958  o.oo  0.497  o.oo  o.oo  0.589  c.oo  0.362  o.oo  0.07
Prop.  hh members,  female over 16  0.864  o.oo  0.558  o.oo  o.0o  0.582  o.oo  0.349  o.ol  0.35
Three generation household  -0.105  0.02  -0.182  o.15  0.55  -0.194  o.oo  -0.303  o.oo  o.i1
Parents + 1 child  0.025  o.65  -0.108  0.38  0.28  -0.134  o.oo  -0.182  0.05  024
Parents +  2 children  -0.031  0.76  -0.178  0.14  0.22  -0.186  o.oo  -0.272  o.o1  0.23
Parents + 3 children  -0.133  o.oo  -0.225  0.09  0.49  -0.222  0.00  -0.341  o.oo  0.10
Other household  structure  -0.077  0.17  -0.303  0.03  0.09  -0.229  0.oo  -0.301  0.01  0.35
Age  of household head  0.016  o.oo  *0.001  0.86  0.05  0.008  0.02  0.009  0.12  0.80
Age  of head, squared (+1000)  0.185  0.00  0.001  0.99  0.02  0.092  o.oo  0.080  0.15  0.59
Gender of head  (female=1)  0.068  0.00  0.066  0.02  0.00  -0.021  0.14  -0.048  0.04  0.27
Household Education, Remittances
Max. yrs. Ed. Of adults in hh  -0.012  0.12  0.028  0.07  0.03  0.015  0.02  0.025  o.o1  0.10
Yrs of ed squared  0.003  o.oo  40.000  0.82  0.00  0.001  0.00  0.000  0.51  0.11
HH receives remittances (yes=1)  0.123  o.oo  0.112  0.04  0.86  0.061  o.oo  0.093  0.02  0.14
Household Land
Irrigated  land, ha.  40.211  o.oo  0.392  o.oo  0.00  0.126  o.oo  0.254  o.oo  0.03
Other annual land, ha.  -0.295  o.oo  -0.173  0.15  0.38  0.088  o.oi  0.339  0.03  0.18
Perennial  land, ha.  0.156  o.oo  0.177  o.1i  o.85  0.152  o.oo  0.168  0.08  0.73
Forest land, ha.  -0.030  0.55  0.075  0.02  0.08  0.065  0.05  0.068  o.11  0.93
Dther ag. Land, ha.  -0.419  0.04  -0.103  0.42  0.18  0.039  0.67  0.194  o.oo  0.27
Irrigated  land, squared  0.057  o.oo  40.046  0.14  0.01  -0.008  0.09  -0.029  0.17  0.18
ther annual land, squared  0.059  o.0o  0.085  0.04  0.58  -0.006  0.38  -. 077  0.22  0.39
Derennial  land, squared  -0.006  0.03  0.011  0.85  0.47  -0.007  o.oo  -0.005  0.77  0.55
Forest land, squared  0.009  0.11  40.008  0.02  0.01  -0.002  0.58  -0.007  0.13  0.43
Other land, squared  0.182  0.04  0.021  0.41  0.08  0.003  0.94  -0.022  0.13  0.99
Constant  6.794  o.oo  7.146  o.oo  0.00  7.870  o.oo  7.526  0.00  0.00
Statistics
R  squared  0.32  0.44  0.63  0.64
No. of observations  5,294  698  5,294  698
Notes:  Pairs of coefficients highlighted  in bold face are slatialically different at the 5%  level.
*p,  eq.  coeffr tests for the equality of coeffidents across the two equations.
C  Coefficients  on commune fixed effects are not shown here.
Source:  Based  on VLSS98.
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Mixed commune sample,  no fixed effects  Mixed commune sample, fixed effects*
Kinh-Hoa  Minority  Kinh-Hoa  Minority
Coeff-  Coeff-  p, eq.  Coeff-  Coeff-  p, eq.
icient  p  ident  p  Coeff.  icient  p  icient  p  Coeff.
ependent variable  Ln. of per ca  ita expenditure
Household Demographics
ousehold size  -0.034  0.11  -0.083  o.oo  0.06  -0.065  o.oo  -0.084  0.00  0.23
rop. hh members 7-16  0.480  o.oo  0.709  o.oo  0.16  0.481  o.oo  0.526  0.00  0.28
rop. hh members, male over 16  0.882  o.oo  0.510  o.oo  0.11  0.562  o.oo  0.405  o.oo  0.48
rop. hh  members, female over 16  0.939  o.oo  0.502  o.oo  0.06  0.602  o.oo  0.299  0.05  0.41
Three  generation household  -0.138  0.22  -0.268  0.02  0.37  -0.207  0.01  -0.314  0.00  0.37
arents + 1  child  0.045  0.57  -0.200  0.12  0.11  -0.146  0.04  -0.215  0.06  0.33
Parents +  2 children  -0.053  o.so  -0.256  0.03  0.15  -0.196  0.02  -0.290  0.01  0.39
arents +  3 children  -0.126  0.22  -0.355  o.oo  0.07  -0.238  0.01  -0.382  0.00  0.18
ther household structure  0.047  0.75  -0.323  0.03  0.03  -0.176  0.03  -0.318  0.01  0.24
Age of household head  0.023  o.0i  0.005  0.53  0.09  0.014  0.09  0.011  0.06  0.44
Age of head, squared (+1000)  0.237  o.01  -0.023  o.T7  0.06  -0.138  0.09  -0.090  0.11  0.40
ender of head (female=1)  0.019  0.68  -0.075  o.01  0.11  -0.02  0.48  -0.041  0.07  0.47
Household Education, Remittances
ax. yrs. Ed. Of adults in hh  0.004  o.az  0.024  0.12  0.43  0.039  o.01  0.024  0.08  0.94
rs of ed squared  0.002  0.03  0.000  0.83  0.14  -0.068  0.92  0.000  0.73  0.83
H receives remittances  (yes=1)  0.171  o.oo  0.075  0.13  0.23  0.089..  0.02  0.078  0.06  0.74
Household Land
Irrigated land,  ha.  -0.060  0.47  0.369  o.oo  0.00  0.122  0.04  0.298  o.oo  0.00
ther annual land, ha.  -0.236  0.02  -0.169  0.14  0.61  0.035  o.51  0.446  0.00  0.02
Perennial land,  ha.  0.145  0.03  0.176  o.18  0.82  0.144  0.06  0.302  o.o1  0.71
orest land, ha.  -0.041  0.44  0.037  0.12  0.23  -0.001  0.98  0.035  0.37  0.44
ther ag.  Land,  ha.  -0.009  0.98  0.048  0.30  0.83  0.142  0.47  0.169  0.01  0.65
Irrigated land, squared  0.024  o.o9  -0.042  o.18  0.06  -0.012  0.28  -0.040  0.05  0.05
ther annual land, squared  0.042  0.02  0.082  0.03  0.31  0.003  0.72  -0.105  0.12  0.11
Perennial land, squared  -0.007  0.18  -0.049  0.41  0.47  -0.009  0.08  -0.146  0.02  0.12
Forest land, squared  0.012  0.o4  -0.005  0.07  0.02  0.006  0.10  -0.004  0.37  0.09
ther land,  squared  -0.066  0.73  -0.021  0.13  0.81  -0.005  0.97  -0.030  0.01  0.42
Constant  6.502  o.oo  7.211  o.oo  0.00  6.501  o.oo  7.575  o.oo  0.00
Statistics
squared  0.31  0.41  0.63  0.62
No. of observations  993  510  993  510
otes:  Pairs of coefficents highlighted  in bold face are stabstcally different at the 5% level.
p. eq. coefl  tests for the equality of coeffidents across the two equations.
Coeffidents on commune  fixed effects are not shown  here.
ource:  Based on VLSS98.
Page 20Appendix 3: MARS models
The models of expenditure  presented in Appendices  1 and 2 are essentially linear, include a large number
of variables,  and do not take  account of possible  interactions  among variables.  Could  one build  a more
parsimonious  model?  To  answer  this,  we  turned  to  the  multiple  adaptive  regression  spline  (MARS)
methodology (Friedman,  1991).
Given a set of variables that are specified by the researcher,  MARS mines  the data  for non-linearities  and
interactions.  More  specifically,  it  creates  a  piecewise  linear  function  for  each  continuous  independent
variable,  starting  with  too  many  change  points  (knots)  and  then  pruning  the  number  of knots  using  a
backward  procedure.  For categorical  variables,  MARS  arranges the  categories for the best fit possible.  It
then looks  for suitable  interactions  between  independent variables.  The result  is a set of basis functions,
which  are  transformations  of independent  variables  taking  into  account  non-linearities  and  interactions.
MARS then estimates a least-squares model using the base functions as independent  variables.  Because the
models are so non-linear, the results are typically presented with the aid of graphs.
For this study the dependent  variable is the log of real per capita expenditure;  separate MARS models were
estimated for the Kinh-Hoa  majority,  and for minority households.  For the Kinh-Hoa  majority,  the basis
functions were determined to be the following:
BF1 =  max(0,  IRRLAND - 131.000);  BF11 =  max(O,  NIRRLAND - 120.000);
BF2 =  max(0,  131.000 - IRRLAND  );  BF12 =  max(0,  120.000 - NIRRLAND );
BF3  =  max(0,  WORKED98 - 6.000)  *  BF2;  BF13 =  max(0,  HEADAGE - 43.000);
BF4 = max(0,  6.000 - WORKED98 )  *  BF2;  BF14 =  max(0,  43.000 - HEADAGE );
BF5 =  max(0,  HHSIZE - 6.000);  BF15 =  max(0,  WORKED98 +  .258859E-06)*BF12;
BF6 =  max(0,  6.000  - HHSIZE  );  BF16 =  (  REMIT =  0) *  BF12;
BF7 =  max(0,  NIRRLAND - 400.000)  *  BF2;  BF18 =  max(0,  PELAND +  .186998E-04)  *  BF1;
BF8 =  max(0,  400.000 - NIRRLAND )  *  BF2;  BF19 =  max(0,  PELAND - 300.000)  *  BF2;
BF9 =  max(0,  PAGE17M - 0.250)  *  BF5;  BF20 =  max(0,  300.000 - PELAND )  *  BF2;
BF1O =  max(0,  0.250 - PAGE17M )  *  BF5;
Definitions of  Variables
IRRLAND.  Area of  irrigated land,  in m
2.
WORKED98.  Years  of education achieved by head of household.
HHSIZE.  Number of household members.
NIRRLAND.  Area  of  non-irrigated annual  land,  in m
2
.
PAGE17M.  Proportion of  household consisting of males 17  and  older.
HEADAGE.  Age  of  head  of  household.
REMIT.  Value of remittances  received by household.
PELAND.  Area of  land planted  in tree crops.
The final model  for Kinh-Hoa was:
Y  =  7.471  +  .139911E-04  *  BF1 - 0.001  *  BF2  +  .282305E-03  * BF3  - .198950E-03  *  BF4  -
0.045  *  BF5  + 0.120  *  BF6 +  .389904E-07  *  BF7  +  .633461E-05  *  BF8 + 0.175  * BF9  -
0.690  * BF10  +  .438774E-05 * BF11  - .435589E-03  * BF12  - 0.004  * BF13  - 0.017  *
BF14  +  .219940E-03  * BF15  - .761529E-03  * BF16  +  .212414E-08  *  BF18  +  .607371E-07
* BF19  +  .388523E-05  *  BF20;
This OLS model had an adjusted R 2 of 0.43, or much better than the R 2 of 0.31  that we found for the model
in Appendix  1.  The MARS  model achieves  this  with just eight variables (see  table above),  and  so helps
one to focus just on the essential elements.
Three  insights emerge,  which can best be explained with the help of the graphs in Figure  Al.  First, as the
age  of the household  head rises to 43,  households become  better off;  after that, older heads  are associated
with  poorer households  (panel  1 in Figure Al).  Second,  more  annual  land (irrigated  and unirrigated)  is
associated  with higher per capita  income.  Only for households  with no land does the educational  level of
the  household  head have  an  important  effect  on  income,  suggesting  that more education (and perhaps  a
move to an urban area)  might be a substitute for more land (panels 2 and 3 in Figure Al).  This raises the
intriguing  possibility that  as population pressure  leads to greater  scarcity of land,  there will  be a stronger
incentive to acquire more  education,  which in due course  will increase  the opportunities  that emerge  in an
increasingly urban and non-agricultural  society.  Third,  as household  size rises, households  are poorer (as
Page 21measured by per capita expenditure);  however  for larger households,  this  effect is moderated  if there is a
high proportion of adult males (panel 4 in Figure Al).
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The  MARS  model  for  minority  households  looks  quite  different,  although many  of the  same  variables
come into play.  The basis functions, and subsequent  model, are as follows:
BF1  - max(O,  HHSIZE  - 8.000);  BF11  =  max(0,  48.000  - HEADAGE  )  *BF3;
BF2  - max(O,  8.000  - HHSIZE  );  BF13  - max(0,  11080.000  - FLAND  )  * BF6;
BF3  - max(O,  WORKED98  - 5.000);  BF14  - max(0,  PAGE0716  +  .120596E-07)*  BF6;
BF4  - max(O,  5.000  - WORKED98  );  BF15  - maxtO,  OTHELAND  - 6500.000)  * BF4;
BF6  - max(O,  18000.000  - IRRLAND  );  BF16  =  max(0,  6500.000  - OTHELAND  )  *  BF4;
BF7  - max(O,  PELAND  +  .252347E-04)  * BF6;  BF18  =  max(0,  360.000  - OTHELAND  )  *  BF2;
BF8  - max(0,  HHSIZE  - 3.000)  *  BF6;  SF19  =  max(0,  NIRRLAND  - 3994.000);
BF9  =  max(0,  3.000  - HHSIZE  )  * BF6;  BF20  =  max(0,  3994.000  - NIRRLAND  );
Definitions of Variables
HHSIZE.  Number  of  household  members.
WORKED98.  Years  of  education  achieved  by  head  of  household.
IRRLAND.  Area  of  irrigated  land,  in  m
2
.
PELAND.  Area  of  land  planted  in  tree  crops.
HEADAGE.  Age  of  head  of  household.
FLAND.  Area  of  forest  land  operated  by  household.
PAGE0716.  Proportion  of  household  aged  7  to  16.
OTHELAND.  Area  of  land  in  other  uses  (i.e.  not  annual,  perennial,  or  forest).
NIRRLAND.  Area  of non-irrigated  annual  land,  in  m
2
.
Page 22Y  =  7.349  - 0.061  * BF1  + 0.193  * BF2  + 0.046  *  BF3 - 0.137  *  BF4  - .486490E-04  *  BF6
+  .120914E-08  *  BF7  +  .344804E-05  *  BF8  +  .101408E-04  * BF9  - 0.002  *  BF11
.723555E-09  * BF13  +  .171787E-04  * BF14  +  .252554E-05  * BF15  +  .163910E-04  * BF16
- .987590E-04  * BF18  +  .194643E-04  * BF19  +  .305935E-04  * BF20;
In this case the fit of the MARS  model (R2=0.46) is close to that of the conventional  model (R2=0.44), but
the MARS model  is more parsimonious.  Not surprisingly,  the more land households have under irrigation
or perennial  crops,  the  better off they are  (panel  1 in Figure  A2); irrigated  land has  a particularly  large
effect  on  per  capita  consumption  levels.  However  the  ability  to  use  irrigated  land  profitably  requires
complementary labor inputs, particularly from the household, as panel 2 in Figure A2 shows.
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The third panel in  Figure A2  shows classic  age and  educational  effects.  Reading  along the  age axis one
sees that  income  rises quickly,  reaching  a plateau once  the  head of the household  is 48  years  old.  The
effect is particularly pronounced  for households with highly-educated  heads.  Looking along the education
axis  we see that more education is associated  with higher living standards.  Finally, the presence of a high
proportion of adolescents in the household appears to be associated with a slightly lower return on irrigated
land (panel 4 in Figure A2).
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